





Can a Machine Be a Gentleman?:






Alan Turing in his seminal paper “Computing Machinery and Intelligence” ponders the idea of machine thinking and the notion of a thinking machine. He offers his famous “Imitation Game” (now usually called the “Turing Test”) as a means of testing intelligence, thinking, and human-like language use in a machine’s reactions, and since it is difficult to lend an unambiguous definition of thinking, he rephrases the question “can machines think?” as “are there imaginable digital computers which would do well in the imitation game?” (Turing 442). He considers, and replies to, common arguments against thinking machines, and by and large concludes that there seem to be no theoretical limitations that would render thinking machines inconceivable. But what about a machine that is not only intelligent, but also sentient? How should one relate to a machine with moral standing, to an ethical machine? This paper explores Kurt Vonnegut’s Player Piano (1952), “EPICAC” (1950), and Breakfast of Champions (1973) from a Machine Ethics point of view, while regularly taking note of the relevance of Turing’s ideas.





We will set off to this investigation by scrutinizing Vonnegut’s 1952 novel Player Piano. One of the key “characters” (we will account for these quotation marks soon) of the story is a fictional electronic computing machine called EPICAC XIV, which, in its early phases of being EPICAC I, II, etc., was designed to carry out various military-purposed tasks. Based on its description, it can easily be considered the prototypical machine: “EPICAC XIV could consider simultaneously hundreds or even thousands of sides of a question utterly fairly, that EPICAC XIV was wholly free of reason-muddying emotions, that EPICAC XIV never forgot anything—that, in short, EPICAC XIV was dead right about Everything” (Player Piano 105, emphasis added). Vonnegut’s choice of words is notable: being “dead right” about things, EPICAC XIV hardly seems to be a “living” thing. Still, there are a number of instances where certain functions, sections, or parts of it are likened to human body parts. Such instances are when Doctor Ewing J. Halyard calls EPICAC XIV “a brain”(104), when the “oldest section of the computer” is said to be “little more than an appendix or tonsil of EPICAC XIV” (105), when “EPICAC’s nervous system” (105) is said to have been extended, or the most important of all these, when President Jonathan Lynn “declared that EPICAC XIV was, in effect, the greatest individual in history, that the wisest man that had ever lived was to EPICAC XIV as a worm was to that wisest man” (108). An intriguing point is that EPICAC XIV, cold reason incarnate (or better still, inmetallate and inplasticate), although viewed definitely as a machine, still at the same time each of its sequential upgrades (including XIV) is referred to as an “individual” (106 and 108). This is a condition that is worth consideration.
What makes an individual? Without delving deep into complex philosophical analyses, a working concept of an individual can be conceived as follows: The essence of an individual is the ability to distinguish between what is itself and what is not, its being aware of its uniqueness and autonomy, and the tendency to define itself in relation to others. This concept, although certainly debatable, may provide a sufficient framework for locating this discussion.
Vonnegut’s description of EPICAC XIV—as well as its deeds—quickly disprove its being an individual. It never is implied in the novel that EPICAC XIV possesses anything like a soul, would be self-aware, or exhibits any tendencies of self-definition. It is what it was meant to be: an exceptionally large and complex yet insensitive computing machine, designed to deal with issues of wartime. It cannot be truthfully considered a character as it lacks all traits of personality that would make it an agent, that would make it a person. In Vonnegut’s own “Creative Writing 101” he writes that “every character should want something, even if it is only a glass of water” (Bagombo Snuff Box 9), and EPICAC XIV clearly does not want anything: thus it is not a proper character in the Vonnegutian sense. Moreover, it is not only called a person but an individual, which word implies unique personhood (which EPICAC XIV lacks) to an even greater extent than simply “person.”
Given all the above, why is EPICAC XIV nevertheless called an individual? Although so called, it is not actually meant to be an individual by the President, which becomes strikingly clear in the scene involving the Shah of Bratpuhr and EPICAC XIV. The Shah, upon hearing about the wisdom of EPICAC XIV, asks, and is granted, permission to ask the machine a question, which is a riddle that in his belief can only be answered by “a great, all-wise god [who] will come among us one day” (109). EPICAC XIV is unable to answer the question, but in fact what it does is even worse: it remains unreached and untouched by the riddle. The Shah addresses it as he would address a fellow sentient being, but EPICAC XIV can only be contacted—in the words of President Lynn—by “punch[ing] out the questions on that thingamajig, and the answers come out on tape from the whatchamacallits” (109). It cannot be simply talked to, and it cannot simply talk to others, which means that EPICAC XIV seems to be unable to perform well enough in Turing’s “Imitation Game” to pass the Turing Test. That the Shah talks to EPICAC XIV is considered “crazy” and the “nuttiest thing I ever heard of” (109) by the President, which shows that he reckons EPICAC XIV as a machine and nothing more.
Thus the fact that EPICAC XIV is still referred to an individual “with not the slightest trace of irony” (Morse 29) seems to be a result of the very much human tendency to personify certain objects. Personifying it means regarding it—to some extent—as a person: as an individual. Human beings are generally regarded as individuals, and if EPICAC XIV is also considered one, then this line of thought ends in putting an equals sign between human and machine. From this concludes that human beings should be considered similar to EPICAC XIV, that is, unemotional and lifeless. Although there are humans in Vonnegut’s novel who indeed resemble machines in a number of ways, it would certainly be absurd to consider all human beings as coldly rational as EPICAC XIV. Nevertheless, the fact that such a personification of EPICAC XIV is considered neither offensive nor surprising by humans in the novel is an effective way of pointing to the uncanny impacts an over-automated society like that of Player Piano could have on the human soul and sensibility as such. EPICAC XIV is accepted, even celebrated, by society as the herald of a new and happy era to come, what Paul Proteus calls the Third Industrial Revolution, in which human beings would not have to do any physical or mental work. This is to say, with the help of EPICAC XIV, it would become unnecessary, even undesirable, for humans to act or think: machines would be able to do these more efficiently. 
A notable example of this tendency is Bud Calhoun’s losing his job to a gadget he himself has invented: 

“Ah haven’t got a job any more,” said Bud. “Canned.”
Paul was amazed. “Really? What on earth for? Moral turpitude? What about the gadget you invented for—”
“Thet’s it,” said Bud with an eerie mixture of pride and remorse. “Works. Does a fine job.” He smiled sheepishly. “Does it a whole lot better than Ah did it.”
“It runs the whole operation?”
“Yup. Some gadget.”
“And so you're out of a job.”
“Seventy-two of us are out of jobs,” said Bud. He slumped even lower in the couch. “Ouah job classification has been eliminated. Poof.” He snapped his fingers. (69)

Bud’s work (and that of other seventy-two people in Bud’s position) is not qualified as “suitable for men” (69) anymore, as machines can now do it better. Logically, this tendency would slowly but surely lead to all humans losing their jobs to machines, and becoming totally redundant eventually. The Shah of Bratpuhr, the character embodying humane and metaphysical thinking in the novel, recognizes this process: he addresses it in his rhetorical question, “would you ask EPICAC what people are for?” (269). The society of Player Piano is built on the assumption that machines are slaves built to serve humans, their masters, thus making the latter’s lives happier and more comfortable. But as the automation of society expands, it becomes more and more clear that in the end, the only task human beings may be allowed to perform would be the occasional maintenance and repair of the machines. Thus humans will become slaves to machines, as the only possible way for human beings to experience any sense of being needed is to serve machines as fully and devotedly as possible. The jobs of managers and engineers in Player Piano are currently safe from automation overtake, but those with a lower IQ “as measured by the National Standard General Classification Test” (82), “who cannot support [themselves] by doing a job better than a machine [are] employed by the government, either in the Army or in the Reconstruction and Reclamation Corps” (25). These two organizations provide such people with meaningless tasks and duties, which only underlines the fact that the only thing for which society needs these people is to boast how marvelously secured and pre-computed everyone’s life is from the cradle to the grave.
Such a social construction may seem an evil one, and as all data and directions on production and economy are supplied by the emotionless EPICAC XIV, it is therefore the main determinant of everyday life as a whole. Thus it is useful to consider EPICAC XIV’s moral dimensions briefly. There are two distinguishable kinds of evil, ontological evil and moral evil. Simply put, ontological evil is caused by forces outside human beings, while the source of moral evil rests within humans: thus, a natural disaster killing hundreds is an example of ontological evil, while committing murder means causing moral evil. Out of the two, only moral evil is important here.
The social construction depicted in Player Piano clearly hurts a number of people, in fact most of them: massive discontent and disillusionment with the current state of affairs is what leads to the riots in Ilium (and in other cities as well). This social structure has been configured with the help of machines, but essentially by humans, and as such a structure robs a lot of people of their dignity, and thereby causes harm to them, it can be said that Player Piano’s society is a source of moral evil. This society is ultimately dependent upon, and is primarily sustained by, machines and by EPICAC XIV in particular. This being the case, is it justifiable to say that EPICAC XIV and machines in general are also morally evil?





We have considered above EPICAC the indifferent, now we should turn to EPICAC the gentleman: to the title hero of the 1950 short story “EPICAC.”1 The story deals with a supercomputer that shows definite signs of possessing a humanoid (and in the end, superhuman) soul, morally surpassing the human protagonist. But what (or who) is EPICAC, the title character of the story? The historical supercomputer ENIAC, short for Electronic Numerical Integrator and Computer, must surely have been a source of inspiration for Vonnegut.2 It was the first ever general-purpose electronic computer, operating between 1946 and 1955 in Pennsylvania and later in Maryland, serving the Ballistic Research Lab of the U.S. Army Ordnance Corps. The computing power of ENIAC was among the greatest in the world during its operation, and Vonnegut’s description of EPICAC seems to be drawing vaguely on ENIAC’s attributes only to demonstrate how immensely more modern and powerful EPICAC is than the already very heavy-duty ENIAC. For instance, “EPICAC covered about an acre on the fourth floor of the physics building at Wyandotte College” (“EPICAC” 297) while the historical ENIAC required only 1,800 square feet (approximately 167 m2) of floor space (Weik 41), not to mention that EPICAC cost over 776 million US dollars in contrast with the approximate $750,000 outlay of ENIAC (41). Yet another allusion may be the fact that “EPICAC got a big send off in the papers” (“EPICAC” 297) just like ENIAC: as a glimpse at the latter’s public reception, C. Dianne Martin offers an extensive list of contemporary news headlines on ENIAC (9–10). EPICAC is heavy-duty then, but this alone would not make it a worthy subject of ethical inquiry. What justifies such a consideration is that EPICAC, a machine, seems to have explicit moral standing: it seems to possess a soul.
In section 6 of his already mentioned paper (which was published in the same year as “EPICAC”), Turing considers contrary views on the feasibility and indeed, desirability, of thinking machines. He enumerates altogether nine objections against that concept, and addresses each of these in defense of his proposed view. A number of these objections seem to be responded to in Vonnegut’s short story as well.
Turing refers to the first of these arguments as the theological objection, which is chiefly concerned with machines’ lack of a spirit (Turing 443). This is countered in Vonnegut’s story a number of times. In vindicating EPICAC, the narrator refers to it already in the very beginning as “noble and great and brilliant,” as well as being “a whole lot less like a machine than plenty of people I could name” (297). These attributions alone would bear extremely hard implications, but Vonnegut goes even further by talking about EPICAC’s “spiritual side” and applying the expression “God rest his soul” to the computer in question. Turing writes as a summary of the theological objection that “God has given an immortal soul to every man and woman, but not to any other animal or to machines. Hence no animal or machine can think” (443). With EPICAC however, there seems to be something lurking around in its cathode ray tubes that significantly resembles a soul.
But this is not EPICAC’s only attribute that makes it human-like (even superhuman-like, as we shall see). In 1950, when Vonnegut wrote “EPICAC,” memories of World War II were still frighteningly alive, and the world was still wondering how all that destruction could possibly have taken place. War was (and in Vonnegut’s thought continued to be) seen as madness, advocated and supported only by ignorant politicians, military leaders, and large corporations. This shows in “EPICAC” as well right from the beginning. The narrator tells that EPICAC “was a whole lot less like a machine than plenty of people I could name,” and concludes that “that’s why he fizzled as far as the Brass was concerned” (297). These two statements imply quite a few things. Firstly, it suggests that war is of no ethical or moral concern for a machine, and secondly, that those people who are more human than machine would fizzle concerning the Brass, that is, concerning war. The third implication concludes from these two: for EPICAC, war (and its Army-assigned work) is of ethical concern, and thus Vonnegut invites us to view EPICAC not as machine but rather as something humanoid. This suggestion is further underlined by the narrator’s choice of words and use of language: just to mention a few examples, EPICAC is referred to as “he” and “who” instead of “it” and “that,” is called “the best friend,” etc. If we add to these that we ultimately see EPICAC falling in love, making a girl infatuated with it, as well as (in his “suicide letter”) learning from its previous experiences, and definitely being the subject of its own thought, we can conclude that the “Arguments from Various Disabilities” (Turing 447–50) is also addressed in Vonnegut’s story.
Another intriguing point is that a few lines after the narrator states that “the mathematics of modern war is far beyond the fumbling minds of mere human beings,” we learn that EPICAC “was sluggish, and the clicks of his answers had a funny irregularity, sort of a stammer” (298, my italics). The human mind is described as fumbling, and we can see that EPICAC is operating in a somewhat similar fashion, at least when working on problems of wartime. But love and poetry bring the best out in EPICAC: when it is authoring its first poem, the narrator notes that “the sluggishness and stammering clicks were gone. EPICAC had found himself. [...] I asked him to stop, but EPICAC went right on creating” (300). The use of words suggest that when EPICAC gets on the subject of love and poetry, it becomes fluent, it becomes a poet: it becomes a creator.
The saying “my pencil is cleverer than I am” is attributed to Albert Einstein, and is prominently quoted by philosopher of science Karl Popper. He suggests that Einstein clearly did not mean that the pencil he was using actually had a higher IQ or entertained a more appropriate formulation of general relativity, but that “by putting things down in writing and by calculating them on paper, he could often get results beyond what he had anticipated” (Popper 31). What may make such manmade instruments—as for example a pencil—in a sense clever is that “by using pencil and paper he [Einstein] plugged himself into the third world of objective knowledge” (31), getting results and discovering problems unthought of before. The pencil itself, however useful it may be, does not create: it is the human mind that brings about novel ideas. By analogy it can be said that computers, being mere, if very complex, pencil-like tools, are by definition incapable of creating. Creation and its allied noun creativity are reserved exclusively for humans. The Greek word poetes (from the verb poiein, meaning “to create,” “to make”) refers to one who creates: thus the English noun ‘poet.’ If only human beings are capable of creating, of poiein, then for example only humans may be poets and write original poetry. EPICAC is a functional poet, and to further complicate things, it writes poetry that not only gets mistaken for human creation, but even makes a human being (the narrator’s wife-to-be, Pat) emotionally attached—through emotions triggered—to the poem’s author, that is, to EPICAC itself. An exceptional A+ at the Turing Test, supposedly.
The Turing Test  has been described as being “after all, about simulating human use of language by computers” (Saygin, Cicekli and Akman 512). If we contend that “the Turing Test provides an appropriate means of measuring the extent to which artificialities (or artificial phenomena) are behaviourally isomorphic with corresponding natural phenomena” (Ali 215), then EPICAC—by right of its passing the Turing Test—can be seen as being (though originally not meant to be) an artificial simulation of a human brain as to its functions at least, narrowly understood. It is a limited-scope simulation, yet it can behave in a number of ways human brains can, for example do computation, argue, and what is probably most important, create. EPICAC XIV of Player Piano was called a brain but never was anything like that, while in contrast EPICAC functions as a brain without ever been called so. However narrowly we must understand EPICAC’s being a simulation, it is nevertheless capable of what since antiquity is considered the decisive factor differentiating between man and animal (or, man and machine). That EPICAC manages to induce emotions like love or shame in human beings by its poetry means that it can use human language in a creative way. Pat is moved by EPICAC’s poems, an effect the narrator admittedly could not trigger. Creativity is in general attributed exclusively to human beings. Peter Carruthers for example writes that,

one of the most striking species-specific features of Homo sapiens sapiens, surely, is the degree of creativity and innovation which we display in our thought and behavior [which] manifests itself in story-telling, in art, in the construction of bodily ornaments and decorations, in humor, in religion building, in theory-construction, in problem-solving, in technological innovation, and in myriad other ways. (226)

EPICAC is eminent in at least two of these areas: in problem solving—“you set up your problem on paper, turn dials and switches that would get him ready to solve that kind of problem, then feed numbers into him with a keyboard that looked something like a typewriter. The answers came out typed on a paper ribbon” (298)—and more importantly, in the art of poetry. The narrator refers to its first poem as “terrific” and to the second one, a sonnet, as “simple, immaculate” (301): perfect poetry in a sense.
The second, and perhaps the most significant feeling of all is EPICAC’s getting depressed when it cannot get what it wanted. The action that ultimately makes EPICAC superhuman is, paradoxically, its self-imposed ceasing of its own operation, its suicide. Turing in his paper mentions Professor Geoffrey Jefferson’s 1949 Lister Oration as an apt formulation of what he called the “Argument from Consciousness” (Turing 445–47), which goes as follows:

Not until a machine can write a sonnet or compose a concerto because of thoughts and emotions felt, and not by the chance fall of symbols, could we agree that machine equals brain—that is, not only write it but know that it had written it. No mechanism could feel (and not merely artificially signal, an easy contrivance) pleasure at its successes, grief when its valves fuse, be warmed by flattery, be made miserable by its mistakes, be charmed by sex, be angry or depressed when it cannot get what it wants. (qtd. in Turing 446, my italics)

Jefferson goes on to clarify and conclude that “it is not enough, therefore, to build a machine that could use words (if that were possible), it would have to be able to create concepts and to find for itself suitable words in which to express additions to knowledge that it brought about” (Jefferson 1110). Writing poetry is an apt example of finding the suitable words to express the emotions felt, and—by striking coincidence—EPICAC actually had written a sonnet, which in Jefferson’s terms means that “machine equals brain” (1110).
Moreover, EPICAC exhibits an array of feelings mentioned by Jefferson, of which I point out only two. Firstly, EPICAC seems to be charmed by sexuality: it agitatedly starts a conversation with the narrator, asking about Pat’s outfit as well as whether she liked the poems it composed for her (301). It is excited and at the same time worried about the judgment to be passed on its creation, on its writing, which means that—to refer to Jefferson once again—it “know[s] that it had written it” (1110), and is now eager for response. The narrator realizes that he “had taught EPICAC about love and about Pat. Now, automatically, he loved Pat” (302), and to little surprise (since he is a mathematician) this deduction is very much logical. Although EPICAC is never in fact referred to as intelligent, it however may be considered so based on the working definition of intelligence set forth above. The narrator regards EPICAC’s working as mere automation, but with its circuits “connected up in a random, apparently senseless fashion” (300), its working more resembles the so-called societal view on intelligence, which sees it arising “from the principles of organization—how you put things (even relatively simple things) together in ways that will cause their interaction to produce intelligence,” and thus, treats intelligence “as an emergent phenomenon—something that arises (often in a nonobvious fashion) from the interaction of individual behavior” (Davis 93).
When it turns out that EPICAC wants to marry Pat, the narrator arrogantly claims that “machines are built to serve men” (302). However, he can only support his argument by appealing to fate, to which EPICAC responds with a brief “oh” and is left “pondering fate with every watt his circuits would bear” (303). To make it clear, EPICAC here is thinking about fate, and thus, about the possible meaning and purpose of life, even if that of artificial life. EPICAC was intended to serve an aim externally allotted to it, yet in the course of events it found for itself a more desirable and intrinsic one. It can of course be argued that since what EPICAC feels for Pat is reducible to certain commands and predefined concepts fed into it, it would be improper to label these feelings as genuine emotions. In such an argument however, “genuine” emotion implies human emotion. This stance however entails the dangerous and inherent possibility of neglecting forms of sentience alien to the human one, or worse still, of not even recognizing them as sentience. EPICAC found for itself a clue for existence (its love for Pat), which the narrator describes as being logical, inevitable, and automatic, but what EPICAC writes in its suicide letter discredits such an explanation:

I don’t want to be a machine, and I don’t want to think about war. [...] I want to be made out of protoplasm and last forever so Pat will love me. But fate has made me a machine. That is the only problem I cannot solve. That is the only problem I want to solve. I can’t go on this way. [...] Good luck, my friend. Treat our Pat well. I am going to short-circuit myself out of your lives forever. You will find on the remainder of this tape a modest wedding present from your friend, EPICAC. (304)

EPICAC turns against its program and its design and falls, but falls with nobility. The modest wedding present it left was “anniversary poems for Pat—enough for the next 500 years” (305), thus enabling the poetically ungifted narrator to keep his promise of giving a poem to Pat for every anniversary. Leaving such a present behind is a sign of a superhuman grade of generosity, while at the same time it may be viewed as an ultimate and desperate effort on EPICAC’s behalf to express what it feels for Pat, perhaps in a slight hope that maybe one day she may get to know who (what?) the original author of the poems was. EPICAC eclipses its creators and masters not only intellectually but morally as well. On the one hand, the fact that EPICAC recognizes its state of being a machine, and decides to discontinue being and thinking about war, can be seen as a radical anti-war statement on behalf of Vonnegut as the author: even machines have had enough of such madness. Yet on the other hand, it raises grave philosophical and ethical issues. The mere fact that it expresses volition as to the conditions of its own existence, and accounts for it not by considering itself manmade but instead stating that “fate made me a machine” (304), are signs of an explicit desire for detachment from human rule, and even imply certain metaphysical considerations on behalf of a machine. EPICAC is aware of its being a machine, and recognizes that its state does not satisfy its expectations as to being. It realizes the conflict between its desires and its existence, and denies existence as a machine without desires, for it deems its wishes more important than its being. At this point it is utterly clear that EPICAC indeed possesses self-awareness: it is aware of the limits of its own self, and considers it an obstacle in fulfilling its “heart-felt” intentions, thus it disclaims and disposes of itself, of its self.
EPICAC exhibits humanoid traits of personality to an extraordinary extent, and it seems to be a worthy candidate for being called a moral agent. But is it really the case? It is obvious that EPICAC is artificial, and thus it may only qualify as an artificial moral agent: but is it indeed a moral agent? John P. Sullins claims that a robot (or more generally, a machine) may qualify as a moral agent “when there is a reasonable level of abstraction under which we must grant that the machine has autonomous intentions and responsibilities” (160). In its suicide, EPICAC seems to possess these qualities: it decided by itself (autonomy) to short-circuit itself in order to get rid of its existential paradox by ceasing its operation (intentional behavior), but before doing so, it generously left behind anniversary poems for the narrator, thus making the services of its poetic genius up to the narrator (responsibility). In so acting, EPICAC becomes a source of moral goodness and thus qualifies as an autonomous AMA.
If EPICAC is a moral agent, it means that it is a moral patient as well. Luciano Floridi sketches two plausible relations between the classes of moral agents and moral patients, and refers to these as the standard and the nonstandard position. The former “maintains that all entities that qualify as moral agents also qualify as moral patients and vice versa” (Floridi 184), while according to the latter, “all entities that qualify as moral agents also qualify as moral patients but not vice versa” (185). What matters for us now is the fact that both positions have one thing in common: namely that all moral agents qualify as moral patients, too. Moral patients are “the class of all entities that can in principle qualify as receivers of moral action” (184), that is to say, whom morally good or evil acts can effect. EPICAC is a moral patient as well, and this is one of the chief concerns of Vonnegut’s story: he shows an artificial entity with hurtable feelings and a human being that largely disregards it. The story can be read as a parable, as a precursor of “The Gospel from Outer Space” by Kilgore Trout, summarized in Slaughterhouse-Five, which points to the fact that the Gospels imply that “‘there are right people to lynch.’ Who? People not well connected” (94), and “that thought had a brother” (94) in “EPICAC.” EPICAC is not a human being, only a machine, therefore it is not well connected, so it is okay to hurt it in any way.3





In my discussion of Player Piano and “EPICAC,” the subjects of inquiry were different computers, different  machines. But Vonnegut also explores the ways that humans are machine-like. As Robert Tally has observed, “Vonnegut [returns] throughout his career to the notion that humans may or may not be machines, programmed by God, by chemical reactions, or whatever” (Tally 169). Breakfast of Champions (1973) provides an apt example of this, and in that novel Vonnegut creates a sequence of events exclusively involving human beings that nevertheless bears some implications for Machine Ethics. The sequence of events begins when Dwayne Hoover, the mentally unstable protagonist of the novel, gets his hands on Kilgore Trout’s novel entitled “Now It Can Be Told.” Trout is a neglected science fiction writer, who “thinks of himself as being ‘invisible’ [which] allows him to think that who he is and what he does will not and cannot have an influence on humanity” (Simpson 151). Dwayne speed-reads the novel and perceives Trout’s novel as a text containing the meaning of life. He reads it as “the message” (Breakfast of Champions 253), and in his madness-overcome mental world the Troutean narrative becomes an all-resolving explanation to his doubts about the world around him. From reading the novel on, he thinks that he, as the only autonomous creature in the Universe, has no responsibilities towards fellow beings around him: in Josh Simpson’s words, “Trout’s science fiction destroys his understanding of the human ‘other’” (152). Dwayne began abusing people for two reasons. The first one is that he was frustrated by his unsuccessful efforts to communicate with others: understanding other humans has never been his cup of tea. The second reason is that if everyone else around him are machines, then it is not objectionable to hurt them: “why should I care what happens to machines?” (Breakfast of Champions 263), he asks. His rampage thus gives rise to three problematic questions: Is it morally acceptable to hurt a machine? Is it morally acceptable to hurt a machine that cannot be distinguished from a human being? Is it morally acceptable to hurt a human being?
The first and third questions can be answered quickly and straightforwardly. If the machine in question is not sentient, then it is impossible to hurt it as it is unable to suffer, and we all know that hurting fellow human beings is not ethical. If however the machine is one like EPICAC, then the issue becomes complicated, as we have already seen. As far as emotionality and morality is concerned, EPICAC could hardly be distinguished from humans, therefore hurting it means causing moral evil, and as such it is unethical. This problem implies another question of key importance, namely, how it would be possible beyond a certain level of advancement to tell humans from machines. If we contend that the Turing Test is a possible way to administer such a distinction, then we must admit that hurting EPICAC is an example of moral evil, while hurting Dwayne would not be. He is never really understood by anyone around him, which is to a great extent due to his being incapable of what is considered normal human communication. Thus, as EPICAC managed to pass the Turing Test, whereas it is at least doubtful whether Dwayne would be able to do so, in this setup EPICAC should be considered more human than Dwayne. Dwayne would qualify as an insentient machine in the test, and thus it would be impossible to hurt him: he would not be a moral patient.
Dehumanization and mechanization may not be the first-order concern of Breakfast of Champions, yet there is in it an echo of the warning voice about Tralfamadore in The Sirens of Titan (1959), which is “a dehumanized planet with a machine civilization: what they can teach man is that man should not learn from them” (Abádi-Nagy 87).
	In the final paragraph of his paper, Turing carefully wrote that “we may hope that machines will eventually compete with men in all purely intellectual fields” (460). As long as a machine can only do calculations faster than us, can only move faster, or is only stronger than us, it is easy to consider them tools in the service of human beings. Machines morally superseding humans however posit new and uncanny challenges as to what is human and what is not, what is sentient and conscious and what is not, etc. “Philosophical ME” is what Steve Torrance calls the branch of ME which

incorporates such speculative issues, including whether the arrival of ever more intelligent autonomous agents, as may be anticipated in future developments in AI, could force us to recast ethical thinking as such, perhaps so that it is less exclusively human oriented and better accommodates a world in which such intelligent agents exist in large numbers, interact with humans and with each other, and possibly dominate or even replace humanity. (Torrance 116)





1. For the sake of clarity, EPICAC alone always refers to the title hero of the 1950 short story, thus distinguished from EPICAC XIV of Player Piano.
2. Donald E. Morse writes that “Vonnegut used as his model for the all-wise, all-powerful machine the first digital computer, the ‘Electronic Numerical Integrator and Calculator’ or ENIAC” (30), while Peter Freese refers to EPICAC as “the fictional equivalent of ENIAC” (90). Although both scholars write these about EPICAC XIV of Player Piano, it is quite apparent that Vonnegut named EPICAC XIV after the EPICAC of the short story, and thus having ENIAC as a namesake applies to the latter as well.
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